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Even though, according to the present custom, politics, 
culture and press of our nation, a single village is in 
no way of the slightest account, nevertheless the 
essential kernel of the social organization of this land 





civilization is, in any case, precisely these scattered 
villages... 






1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the village of Bireka in central Kordofan in western Sudan, as 
elsewhere, the political actions of persons at the 'capillaries' of power, and 
their 'ordinary' village-level competitions over resources, are enmeshed in 
discursive struggles over the meanings of representations of gender, ethnicity, 
class and community.  People understand the power of these notions, and they 
understand how actions, practices and words constitute and transform 
representations.  They do not hesitate to use representations to legitimate, 
justify and naturalize particular interests. 
 Analyzing political relations, then, involves viewing politics as a process 
where contestations over representations are central events.  In a prescient 
discussion, Cohen (1969:224) succinctly summed up this approach: 
Some action theorists take the rules of the game, i.e. the symbols 
governing social behavior, as given and as being outside the 'arena' 
in which the struggle for power takes place, when in fact these 
symbols are dramatically involved in the whole process at every one 
of its stages. 
Local and national discourses of gender, ethnicity and class are mobilized to 
reshape the framework and rules that regulate political actions and determine 
access to resources (Berry 1993; Watts 1988; and Moore 1994).  Gendered roles 
in public and conjugal spaces are often key battlefields where access is 
disputed. For example, Carney and Watts (1990) show how the Gambian state gave 
men control over irrigated rice plots that were formerly controlled by women.  





brought about by these changes were played out on one 'terrain' of gender- what 
it meant to be a husband/wife in a Mandinka household, and what comprised their 
respective rights and obligations.  Men and women use the full range of dominant 
and subversive gender ideologies in the process of struggles, not just within 
households, or between men and women, but also in confounding and influencing 
struggles involving other social identities and relationships (Di Leonardo 1991; 
Moore 1992). 
 Most analyses of political processes in Sudan, however, tend to ignore the 
centrality of these gender, ethnic and class representations.
ii
  The problem of 
maintaining national unity in northern Sudan, for instance, is seen as a problem 
of political sectarianism, elite action, and foreign intervention.  Warburg's 
(1985:237; see also, Warburg 1993) assertion is typical of this approach to 
Sudanese politics: 
With Ansari followers concentrated in the western regions of Kordofan 
and Dar Fur, in close proximity to an unpredictable ruler like 
Qadhafi, the very precarious unity of this vast Sudanese state could 
be threatened. 
 
The analysis- basically of passive peasant 'followers' waiting for the call from 
'unpredictable' rulers- is belied by the absence of a textured analysis of local 
politics of the 'followers'. 
 This is important because analysts are overlooking what we believe might 
be a central paradox of popular conceptions of contemporary Sudan.  The military 
regime and the National Islamic Front (NIF), who took power in 1989 under the 
rubric of the 'National Salvation Revolution', are attempting to manipulate local 
processes in order to acquire legitimacy.  The domination of discourses and 





others have called 'Turabi's Revolution', after the NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi.  
The appearance of the first automatic rifle in a village neighboring Bireka in 
the spring of 1992 symbolized what the regime hoped to achieve in its program to 
transform rural 'tradition'.  The rifle belonged to a young man, Jaabir, who had 
led a militia for three months in the nearby Nuba Mountains, fighting with 
government forces against the local insurrection.  He had travelled to Chad and 
Darfur as part of a delegation recruiting for a nationalist Islamic youth 
organization known as 'The Nation's Youth' or Shabab al-Watun.  His rhetoric was 
explicitly anti-local.  He interpreted events and ideas through the lens of 
national politics.  He thought of himself as a citizen of a modern, Islamic 
nation. 
 The paradox is that the regime's attempts to 'create' more Jaabirs may be 
leading many Sudanese to embrace discourses, symbols and practices that 
contradict the NIF program, and which undermine their goal of creating legitimacy 
'from below'.  We illustrate this point with a discussion of a second conflict 
in Bireka, over the regulation of a roadside market.  There, women in Bireka who 
joined the Shabab al-Watun used their membership as a rhetorical weapon in their 
fight against policies implemented by local agents of the government.  Beating 
local history to the rhythm of Khartoum, by recruiting and training people like 
Jaabir, could well exacerbate an already well-established trend towards civil 
breakdown. 
 This paper marks a first step toward understanding the micro-politics of 
this civil breakdown.  We focus particular attention on examining two central 
conflicts in the village of Bireka during the three years between 1989 and 1992.  





Arab villagers raised the issue of the proper public behavior of women.  Poorer 
villagers and villagers from 'marginalized' ethnic groups opposed what they saw 
as an attempt by wealthy families to preserve and extend their power by wresting 
away control of valuable grain.  They entangled the conflict in more general 
issues of ethnic marginalization and class solidarity.  In a second conflict 
over the participation of women in market activity along a roadside, villagers 
again mobilized representations of class, gender and ethnicity.  Some villagers 
argued that the roadside was an inappropriate work environment for women tea 
sellers.  The closure of the stands was seen by others as marking the definitive 
ascendance of 'Arab' villagers over their Hausa and Burgo neighbors.  Other 
villagers appreciated the role played by competition for economic advantage; 
even some wealthy villagers declared that the motive driving the obstructionists 
was that they hoped to eliminate competitors and muscle their way into the 
lucrative market activity. 
 These conflict situations revealed the critical role played by the military 
regime and the NIF as their policies and rhetoric were applied and manipulated 
to fit local contexts.  The delegation of authority to agents and descendants 
of the former Native Administration determined the outcome of the second 
conflict.  Women stopped selling tea after the local omda ordered them whipped.  
His decisiveness in the action was facilitated in part by the regime's ambiguous 
message about the role of women in public life.  Leaders of the regime encouraged 
more female participation, but actions were taken- such as enforcing prohibitions 
against beer-brewing in rural areas- that undermined women's livelihoods.  The 
regime has had a similarly ambivalent attitude towards ethnic issues.  It offered 





social groups that did not advocate the orthodox version of Islam promoted by 
the NIF.  The regime demanded that villagers place their identity as 'Sudanese' 
above local considerations, but defined 'Sudanese' in ways that are at odds with 
many of the diacritical marks of local identity.  In short, the regime had not 
altered the basic exclusionary nature of centralized political rule in Sudan.  
Villagers in Bireka incorporated and manipulated this exclusionary rhetoric and 
policy. 
   The paper is organized as follows.  Section Two summarizes the national 
context of economic decline and a military regime intent on transforming certain 
aspects of social life and politics.  Section Three describes the norms and 
representations that form the political framework of the village, paralleling 
them with national policy and rhetoric.  The village study is based on fieldwork 
conducted during late 1989 through late 1990, and with a follow-up visit in late 
1992.  Section Four analyzes two conflicts in Bireka that illustrate how national 
representations intermix with the multiple layers of meaning that underlie local 
politics.  Finally, we conclude by returning to the paradoxical outcome of 
increasing civil breakdown and change raised in this introduction. 
 
2. STATE REPRESENTATIONS AND POLICIES 
 Nearly all commentators agree that in the ten years since the publication 
of Ali Abdel Gadir Ali's The Sudanese Economy in Disarray the Sudanese economy 
has gone from disarray to almost total collapse.  Gross National Product per 
capita stagnated after the mid-1970s oil crisis, and declined steadily through 
the 1980s.  The industrial sector has exhibited almost no new investment.  Yields 





collapse has been particularly evident in Kordofan province.  Riely (1991) has 
documented the growing poverty (and feminization of poverty) among settled nomads 
in North Kordofan.  Ahmed (1987) traces the increasing marginalization of herders 
and farmers in dar Hamr in western Kordofan.  Manger (1981) and Abdalla (1985) 
have presented evidence on ecological deterioration. 
 The proximate causes of this collapse are civil war, drought, refugees, 
adverse international sanctions, and national mismanagement.  Rainfall has been 
declining since the 1960s for most of northern Sudan.  The ongoing civil war has 
prevented successive governments from managing the economy in the interests of 
'development'.  The government's investment budget is sorely taxed by the war; 
in 1989/90 almost one quarter of all government spending went to the military 
(Mohamed 1993).  Numerous sources indicate an escalation in military spending 
since then.  The war has displaced millions of southern Sudanese.  Many have set 
up squatter camps outside of major northern cities, further taxing limited state 
resources.  Sudan also hosted several hundred thousand refugees from neighboring 
conflicts. 
 The influx of foreign aid that financed state-led investment in the 1970s, 
and provided relief during the droughts and refugee crises of the 1980s, has 
been cut off since the coup of 1989.  The IMF and World Bank have treated Sudan 
as an international pariah, taking the country further along the path to 
expulsion than any other recalcitrant debtor.  Capital flows from private banking 
and financial sources are paltry.  Only the large flow of remittances from 
workers in the Gulf States, Iraq, and Libya has kept the economy afloat.  Even 
so, the remittances have proved a mixed blessing.  Brown (1992) argues that 





international agencies, and the resulting distortions in prices and policies, 
contributed heavily to the mismanagement of the macroeconomy. 
 From a political economy perspective, the collapse of the Sudanese economy 
may be seen as the inevitable outcome of processes of disarticulation and 
dependency, of peripheral incorporation into the global market economy (Sultan 
1993; Suliman 1992; Mohamed 1989; Ahmed 1987; El Mekki 1986; Tully 1988; and 
Prendergast 1991).  Privileged classes, including the military, have transformed 
the colonial legacy of a relatively strong state into an instrument for 
'accumulation from above'.  The organization African Rights (1994) goes so far 
as to argue that the civil war is perpetuated by the rent-seekers who benefit 
from the distortions justified in the name or wartime exigencies.  The use of 
the state to transform property relations, especially in the mechanized farming 
areas, manipulate markets for agricultural goods, and regulate labor relations 
on the large-scale irrigated schemes, usually to the detriment of migrants from 
the west, have precipitated a process of differentiation and deterioration in 
the more peripheral rural areas. 
 In this context of increasing vulnerability and marginalization, the 
Revolutionary Command Council of the military regime that assumed power in the 
June 1989 coup, and its ally the National Islamic Front, have vigorously pursued 
a program of transforming both rural and national politics.
iii
  Because of the 
lack of any significant power base in the country, the process has been top-
down, rather than grass-roots.  We focus here on three of the more salient 
transformations emanating from Khartoum and affecting rural areas: the return to 
Native Administration; changes in the rhetoric about the proper behavior of 





i. The Return to Native Administration 
 One of the most significant changes made by the Khartoum government has 
been to return authority to adjudicate local disputes and collect taxes to 
'traditional' leaders.  These leaders, the sheikh at the village level, omda at 
the district level, and nazir or makk at the 'tribal' level, were given a great 
deal of power during the Condominium period of 'joint' British-Egyptian rule.  
The British moved towards Native Administration or Indirect Rule in order to 
save money on administration and minimize the influence of a nascent effendi 
class of bureaucrats (Voll 1971).
iv
  The power of traditional leaders continued 
throughout the colonial period, as they came to dominate the rural councils that 
were eventually supposed to replace Native Administration.  After independence 
the military regime of General Abboud sought the support of traditional leaders 
and deliberately appointed them to the councils. 
 The first serious challenge to the sheikhs came in the late 1960's (Howell 
1973; Nyquist 1966).  The civilian government that followed the October uprising 
against General Abboud attempted to eliminate completely any legitimacy 
associated with a traditional title, partially because leftist and urban 
politicians felt that traditional leadership was too conservative.  These initial 
attempts at reform were unsuccessful, but Jaafar Nimeiri moved decisively after 
assuming power in the 1969 coup.  The People's Local Government Act of 1971 
formally ended any nationally-sanctioned authority for traditional leaders and 
explicitly prevented them from joining the new People's Councils.  Centrally 
appointed judges and administrators (dabit) were to take over the judicial, 
development, and taxation responsibilities.  Even this definitive attempt to 





in one local council in eastern Sudan traditional leaders continued to exercise 
considerable authority, often remaining as members of the People's Councils and 
courts that had formally replaced them. 
 The enduring power of traditional leaders, as a class, is due the wealth 
they have been able to accumulate through the privileges of office.  They 
benefitted from access to education, and their children have often moved into 
positions in local bureaucracies, consolidating their influence over local 
affairs.  Many leaders transformed this wealth and influence into patronage 
networks that maintained a solid core of loyal followers.  They have drawn upon 
a reservoir of religious, ethnic and kinship solidarities to legitimize their 
leadership role. 
 The military government and NIF restored the authority of the traditional 
leaders during the early 1990's presumably for the same reasons that had 
motivated the British.  They disempowered the educated, 'secular' administrators 
and justices, saved money on administration, and created a class of political 
actors with a strong stake in the regime.  Some of the legitimacy of tribal 
leaders 'rubbed off' on the national regime, which had very little legitimacy 
given the inability to resolve the economic and military problems that were the 
ostensible factors motivating the takeover. 
 From the regime's point of view, investing traditional leaders with power 
could be seen as reestablishing Islamic governance.  Many traditional leaders 
are intimately linked to the Sufi tariga that have been an important part of 
political life at the national level.  The local populace feels that descendants 
of the holy men who founded some villages inherit their baraka, their grace.  





describes this complex and contingent process in Um Dubban, a village in northern 
Sudan, where the descendants of a Sufi holy man continued running his school for 
Koranic studies.  These descendants gradually began to define themselves as a 
separate ethnic group, and were successful in monopolizing the positions of omda 
and sheikh.  This phenomenon of simultaneous religious and political leadership 
is probably more prevalent in eastern than in western Sudan; this remains an 
interesting and open question for comparative research within Sudan. 
ii. The Status of Women 
 Being a Muslim is a defining feature of women's lives: women pray five 
times a day, observe Ramadan, give aid to those in need, and some even have made 
the hajj to Mecca.  The national regime has used the language of Islam to manage 
an ongoing and sometimes contradictory evolution of public norms and practices 
surrounding the role of men and women in public life.  Islam has of course always 
been used in negotiating these gendered roles.  Local gender divisions of labor, 
conjugal contracts, and formal segregation in public spaces are believed to be 
based on Islamic ideas.  Economic necessity, however, has forced poorer rural 
(and urban) women to work and interact in public spheres (El Bakri and Kameir 
1990).  Riely (1991) illustrates how permanent drought and migration of men has 
resulted in a feminization of poverty in the northern part of Kordofan province.  
Most women have income-generating enterprises; they either work on their own 
agricultural plots, market foodstuffs, or brew beer. 
 An analogous economic process- the migration of men to the Gulf Stares and 
Saudi Arabia- has led to a reconceptualizing of the role of women in many parts 





changing complexity of local representations and practices of womanhood in the 
context of a riverain village in Northern Sudan (1989:344), by observing that: 
It is undeniable that women's behavior is more rigorously controlled 
than men's.  Moreover, women are under considerable pressure to 
conform to the rather specific ideals of their sex... they are jural 
minors all their lives and subject to notable constraints throughout 
their reproductive years.  And this situation, if the fundamentalist 
repercussions of men's Arabian labor experience and the recent (1983) 
declaration of shari'a law are any indication, is currently 
intensifying. 
 These evolving and sometimes unacknowledged changes in norms and practices 
set the context for regime policy.  The NIF has rejected the 'traditional' 
attitudes towards women.  According to El-Affendi (1991:174): 
... the stance which is more in line with Islamic principles would 
be to accept full participation of women in public life, subject to 
reasonable safeguards and provisions allowed for in Shariah.  
Whatever the potential damage that may arise from free mixing of the 
sexes, this should not be used as an argument to deprive women of 
the actual and undisputable benefits of participation in public 
life... 
In terms of specific policies, the NIF claims to have encouraged the 
participation of women in political and public life.  Hassan al-Turabi, in Lowrie 
(1993:46-7), argued that the appointment of around thirty women to the national 
parliament, and equal (though segregated at some levels) access to education, 
was evidence that "the issue of women in the Sudan is no longer a topical issue." 
 Many women, primarily from the middle and upper urban educated class, would 
agree with this position.  They have had increased access to political 
participation and have actively taken part in and benefitted from the 
'Islamisation' process.  They have not resented, and indeed many welcome, the 
requirements that women wear less-revealing garb when in the streets.  They 





Police' to 'ensure the strict application of shari'a in the streets and in daily 
life', despite knowing that a primary activity of such a People's Police would 
be the harassment of women whose clothing was not up to standard.
v
 
 This position is a tacit denial of the discriminatory economic effects of 
the dress policy, against poorer women who must invest in new clothing, and 
against female office workers who choose not to abide by the regulations.  Other 
government decrees have discriminatory and negative consequences.  Beer brewing, 
a traditional source of income for many rural women, is being prohibited with 
renewed vigor.  Women working outside of the house after sunset are regarded as 
suspect, and punished for their 'loose ways'. 
 The result is an ambiguous government ideology encouraging the comparative 
luxury of political participation but discouraging the necessity of working 
outside the home, by promoting an image of the Sudanese woman devoted to home 
and family life.  This, at a time when economic crisis has effectively forced 
many women to search for alternative 'public' employment.  While the national 
government has largely not tried to forcibly implement its decrees, local powers 
in various parts of Sudan have tried to enforce these decrees by shutting down 
market activities and intervening in beer brewing. 
iii. Being 'Sudanese'  
 If the new Sudanese woman stays at home, the new Sudanese man wears a 
'fundamentalist' beard.  The cynic says that the 'beard brings the bread', but 
even in jest the new representation is thus acknowledged.  The present regime 
is refining the nationalist notion that unified and rallied the forces that 





independence.  'Being Sudanese' is being made equivalent to 'being a particular 
kind of Muslim'. 
 Nationalist representations have been a prominent feature of national-
level Sudanese politics since the Mahdiyya.  This discourse takes on a particular 
importance because of the prolonged North-South conflict and the problem of 
competing Afro-Arab identities.
vi
  A voluminous literature contends that Sudanese 
nationalism is an answer to the North-South problem.  Inclusive nationalism- a 
lip balm to heal angry sentiments of supposed cultural oppression- was the 
rhetorical norm for most of the post-independence period.
vii
  The rhetoric could 
be used to practical effect; Bechtold (1976:158, 195) observes that the revised 
1957 Sudanese Nationality Ordinance allowed the Umma party to grant citizenship 
to and register loyal Hausa and other West Africans. 
 The NIF has been explicit about equating 'being Sudanese' with a particular 
Islamic orthodoxy.  Hale (1992) quotes Wisal al-Mahdi, the wife of Hassan al-
Turabi and an NIF activist: 
We want Islam to judge our cases; we want Islam to judge our economical 
activities... We want Islam to be practiced in everyday life, not 
just inside the house...we don't want it to be only in a corner of 
the life of the family.  We want it to be the core of life...[for] 
the whole society and the whole Sudan and the whole Muslim world.  
That is the only difference between the NIF and the [rest of] 
Sudanese society as it has existed since independence. 
Hassan al-Turabi has voiced similar sentiments about the Sudanese nation:  
So there is an attempt, now, to contain the whole Sudan, the Salafis, 
the Sufis, the Ansar, the Khatmiya, even the smaller sects, religious 
sects, and the small groups in society, and the professions, and the 
artisans; everybody is there. (Lowrie, 1993:45) 
 
 The nobility of the sentiment expressed is betrayed by the glaring omission 





out of the picture- not only the objects of a jihad, they might not be even 
second-class citizens in the northern half of the 'Islamic Republic'.  The 
exclusionary emphasis, paradoxically phrased as inclusion, directly affects 
Muslim residents of northern Sudan.  The government sees the various religious 
brotherhoods, the tariga, as closer or further to their definition of the proper 
'Sudanese' norm.  Late in 1993 a number of Khatmiya, Ansar and Ansar Sunna 
mosques were closed.
viii
  It may well be that the government is simply continuing 
a local process of redefinition.  Doornbos (1988:99) noted the existence of a 
'growing polarisation within communities... as to the proper way to live as a 
Muslim.'  This polarisation has now been harnessed by the government and attached 
to nationalist notions.  As Simone (1994:84) puts it: 'By emphasizing its role 
as both the purveyor of radical difference and the restorer of an essential 
identity, the Islamic movement can legitimate its claims to state power without 
ever having to substantiate an economic program...' 
 This rhetoric also influences local representations of ethnicity.  It is 
ironic that much of the original work on the fluidity and mutability of ethnic 
identity was once carried out in western Sudan (Barth 1969).  Where in the 1970's 
this nuanced and textured approach to ethnicity seemed to facilitate the 
tolerance of diversity, the regime has twisted the language of tolerance into a 
rhetoric of inclusion, going so far as to deny the very legitimacy of ethnic 
sentiment.  Hassan al-Turabi declared (in Lowrie 1993:35-36, 63) that in Sudan 
there is no such thing as ethnicity, that ethnicity is incompatible with Islam 
('Muslims don't know ethnic minorities.'), and that ethnic minorities will 
'disappear'.  This ambivalence is profoundly disturbing to members of ethnic 





members of northern riverain culture have monopolized power and discriminated 
against them.  A further source of concern is the regime's reliance on informal 
militias, organized along tribal or ethnic lines, to fight as proxies in the 
civil war (De Waal 1993).  The arming of tribal militias escalates the stakes 
in inter-ethnic conflict, which makes them all the more difficult to resolve 
peacefully. 
 
3.  POLITICAL POWER AND REPRESENTATIONS IN BIREKA VILLAGE 
 The new national-level representations described above were inserted into 
the evolution of intra-village social relations in Bireka, a small village of 
approximately sixty households in Kordofan province.
ix
  Authority was devolved 
to the omda, away from the civil judge and regional administrator (dabit).  
Villagers participated in regional conferences on Islamic administration.  The 
granting and withholding of visas, travel permits, identity cards- all important 
benefits of citizenship- were interpreted in terms of identity.  Villagers 
accused each other of not following 'proper' Islamic codes of behavior.  They 
held conflicting interpretations of the ambiguous new rhetoric on the role of 
women in society.  This section provides a broad overview of village politics 
and representations in this context of changing national policy and rhetoric.  
The following section then concentrates on showing how changes were manifested 
and manipulated in two village conflicts. 
 For Bireka devolution of official authority to the omda had been the object 
of considerable discussion.  Formal political authority in the village had until 
then been invested in the village sheikh and the village representatives to the 





maintaining village order, resolving disputes and collecting the animal tax.  
The district omda, the traditional leader of about fifty village sheikhs in the 
Sheikan area of dar Bederiya (the home area of the Bederiya tribe under the 
British system of Native Administration) also lived in Bireka.  He and his two 
brothers were very active in village politics and the resolution of disputes, as 
the sheikh was rather ineffectual.  Both the sheikh and omda were nominally 
hereditary positions, though in practice over the past century genealogical links 
were rather tenuous. 
 The village members of the People's Committee represented the village to 
the regional government in El Obeid, and were responsible for the collection and 
distribution of rationed commodities like sugar, tea, soap and grain.  Committee 
members were supposed to be elected, but in Bireka as elsewhere were more often 
selected through consensus, with holders of political power agreeing amongst 
themselves who the representatives should be.   
 These holders of formal political power were members of ethnic groups that 
shared a loose identity as Arabs, in contra-distinction with groups whose origins 
lay further west- primarily Hausa and Burgo.
x
  The Arabs were divided into 
different groups- Tumam, Beni Fadl (a sub-section of the Bederiya), Mima and 
Jellaba.  Arab ethnicity was sensitive in Bireka because of the association of 
the Tumam with Nuba origins.  Thus for some Tumam and Bederiya were 'like 
brothers- same tribe', while others went out of their way to explain the 
differences.  There were strong relations of marriage among the Tumam and Beni 
Fadl. 
 The omda was from the Tumam.  Many villagers feared that he would exercise 





informants predicted that he would not hesitate to use his power.  He would have 
policemen with guns.  He would be able to whip those who committed misdemeanors.  
He could send to El Obeid those suspected of greater crimes.  His word alone 
would adjudicate land disputes, animal trespasses, divorces, drunkenness, theft, 
and all the other small crimes of the district.
xi
 
 Part of the reason why the devolution of authority to the omda was important 
in Bireka was that four wealthy households from the Tumam and Beni Fadl groups 
already commanded substantial economic power.  The four families were also joined 
through marriage ties.  In one family, a young man had migrated to Saudi Arabia 
and worked for many years as a teacher.  Upon his return the family bought a 
lorry and started a large irrigated vegetable garden with a diesel pump.  Another 
wealthy family was that of the omda.  His sons and his brothers' sons worked as 
teachers, government officials, and operated a small local bakery and irrigated 
garden.  Their daughters were married to prominent and wealthy villagers from 
surrounding villages.  The head of a third family was the People's Committee 
representative for the village. 
 While economic and political power was concentrated in Arab hands, 
numerical strength lay with the two-thirds of Bireka residents who called 
themselves Hausa.
xii
  Though they were the majority, Hausa status as immigrants 
had prevented them from holding overt political power.  Many Hausa, even those 
born in Sudan, were not citizens.  Nationality laws have been fairly strict 
since Independence.  Citizenship has been crucial for securing possession of 






 The older Hausa men and women settled in Bireka on their return from 
pilgrimages to Mecca in the 1930's and 40's.  While most men and younger women 
were fluent in Arabic, they continued to speak Hausa at home, and retained a 
strong sense of their Nigerian identity.  They did not intermarry with Arabs or 
Burgo.
xiii
  The Hausa practiced a more ascetic, mystic and ritualized form of 
Islam.  Married women were more strictly secluded than women of other groups, 
but unmarried girls had few restrictions on their movements.  One primary 
signifier of difference between Hausa and the other groups in Bireka was that 
Hausa women did not work in agriculture.
xiv
  Unmarried girls worked in the fields 
with their fathers and brothers, but more frequently they took to market 
processed food products that their older female relatives had prepared.
xv
  Another 
difference between Hausa and other groups was that Hausa women were not 
circumcised.  Although many urban Hausa girls were being circumcised in the 
process of 'becoming Sudanese', these rural dwellers held fast to this 
representation of their Hausa identity. 
 This local culture is perhaps best seen as part of the process of 
constructing a local Hausa identity.  The Hausa in Bireka were actually of quite 
different origins: some would distinguish their Sokoto or Kano background; others 
were Fulani; others bore the distinct facial scars of the Borno from Damagara.  
O'Brien (1986) suggests that local animosity has caused many West African 
immigrants in Sudan to emphasize differences between them and local people, and 
play down intra-group differences.  Migrants have deliberately created separate 
ethnic identities; 'In defensive adaptation to circumstances of discrimination 





commonalities of their past heritage and contemporary circumstances to forge a 
more or less coherent ethnic identity' (O'Brien, 1986:902).
xvi
 
 While the Hausa in Bireka constituted themselves as a distinct ethnic 
group, there were sharp internal divisions within the group based on wealth.  
They were divided into two quarters, one consisting predominantly of poorer 
households, the other of the wealthier families.  The wealthier families 
represented the Hausa community in village meetings, and acted as leaders in 
internal disputes and debates.  They had followed patterns of accumulation 
similar to the wealthy Arab families: sons had migrated to Libya, one family had 
purchased a lorry, another had established a store on the roadside (described in 
more detail below), and two had established small irrigated gardens. 
 The first large community to settle in Bireka were Burgo from the Chad 
border areas.  Most had since moved to an entirely Burgo village further to the 
south, and in 1989 there were only a few Burgo left in Bireka.  Nevertheless, 
they played an important role in village politics because they often sided with 
the Arabs; together the two minority groups almost matched (in the numerical 
sense) the Hausa.  The Burgo were much more closely integrated with the Arabs 
than with the Hausa.  In the span of one generation, Arabic had become their 
primary language; many of the younger children did not speak or understand the 
Burgo language.  Because the Burgo in Bireka had adopted Arab cultural values, 
many people called them 'Burgowia Arab'.  This contrasted quite strongly with 




 One of the distinguishing characteristics of Burgo households was the 





of income-generation: brewing sorghum beer, which was sold and drunk in their 
homes, and operating road-side tea and food stands.  Young unmarried Burgo women 
dominated this roadside commerce.  Only Burgo permitted young unmarried women 
to work in these public tea shops.  The income derived from the tea shops far 
exceeded the daily return from other activities, both male and female.
xviii
  For 
this reason, in several families these young women were the primary bread-
winners.  This economic strength allowed many Burgo women to expand their 
comparatively large level of personal autonomy.  For example, most married and 
unmarried Burgo women did not directly pool their income with the male household 
head.  These young unmarried tea sellers followed this trend, not sharing their 
income with their fathers, but controlling it and even investing it in productive 
enterprises.  One young women rented a plot of land and hired laborers to farm 
it.  This independence in the economic sphere did not necessarily translate into 
liberty in other personal spheres.  A young Burgo woman was told one evening 
that the next day she was to be married to a man from El Obeid. 
 The common norms associated with Islam were of course important in defining 
the role and actions of women.  Changing national representations were felt in 
the village.  Two younger women who had attended secondary school in El Obeid 
wore the hijab in the village; several uneducated young women who worked selling 
tea along the road also adopted this 'Islamic' dress.  More importantly, the 
brewing of local sorghum beer became the object of heightened police interest.  
This beer, merissa, was the primary source of income for six Burgo and Arab women 
in the village.  After a raid by the police, four of them stopped brewing the 
beer.
xix
  Their economic situation deteriorated markedly.  This persecution of 





laws in 1983 one of the Burgo women had been whipped.  She had returned to 
brewing, but in 1990 she stopped again 'for the duration'. 
 The regime's vigorous promotion of particular Islamic orthodoxies was felt 
in other realms of village life.  The government tried to dominate local 
religious ritual.  Late in 1990 the government ordered villages to organize 
Islamic rain prayers (salat al istisqa').  While serving an exemplary and 
absolutely necessary purpose, given the widespread drought and crop failure, the 
prayers also conveniently served to generate implicit public displays of the 
legitimacy of the regime.  Some neighboring villages had already initiated rain 
prayers and fasting and karama, communal meals with prayer, on their own.
xx
  In 
Bireka all the villagers- Hausa, Burgo and Arab- were to pray together (normally 
in the village they each prayed in their own mosques, only praying together on 
Fridays at the large mosque in the market village).  In a highly political act, 
one Burgo man, a respected/feared faqih, refused to participate in the prayers.  
His argument at the time was that the government could not determine the method 
and rituals of prayer- doing so violated the whole spirit of prayer. 
 The changing role of Islam in public life especially affected the Hausa, 
who were, as we will see more clearly below, caught in a dialectic of 
incorporation and separateness.  As many of them were not officially recognized 
citizens, the benefits from incorporation were great.  At the same time, 
maintenance of Hausa identity was important in the struggles over control of 
village politics.  New conflations of Islam and 'being Sudanese' were a 
significant source of anxiety in casual conversation, and several Hausa men had 
taken the initiative of regularly attending evening 'classes' given by the imam 





visited the village, and the Hausa enthusiastically agreed to participate in the 
setting up of a program for religious education of boys.  A Hausa man was 
appointed to be faqih and lead the boys in reciting the Koran every evening.  
Arab boys participated in the first week, but then their parents decided they 
should no longer attend. 
 Finally, lest the reader think that life in Bireka was nothing more than 
stratagems and spoils
xxi
, we should note that everyday politics was constrained 
by a shared awareness of the crucial nature of language about community.  
Throughout most of our stay in Bireka, the standard answer to questions about 
village politics was: 'There are no problems here, we live together peacefully.' 
 But this solidarity was tempered by the sharp gradations of wealth within 
the village, and quite articulate notions of class consciousness within the 
village.  As noted above, there were several Arab and Hausa families who were 
significantly wealthier than others, with large livestock holdings, irrigated 
gardens, lorries or trading capital, and relatives who had migrated to Iraq, 
Libya and the Gulf States.  They contrasted with the one-third of households 
which had male or female members who worked as daily laborers, and whose household 
assets typically consisted of their hut, a few goats, and simple household 
furnishings.  These differences did not result in any overt class conflict, at 
least not in 1989 or early 1990.  Labor relations were cordial, with an active, 
competitive, and decentralized market for hiring spot labor.  Laborers were not 
enmeshed in debt relations with their employers.  Indeed, there was almost no 
intra-village debt at all.  Nevertheless, poor villagers would often note the 
structural differences in the village, and how those differences translated into 





selected as members of the People's Committee, in charge of securing and 
distributing rationed commodities, and the weekly distributions were the sites 
of numerous arguments.  There were frequent muttered complaints of corruption 
and favoritism, both in Bireka and in the larger market villages. 
 Village unity was also undermined by the ethnic differences described 
above.  Hausa, Burgo and Arab all prayed in their own small village mosques.  
They did not share in the breaking of Ramadan fasting together, each small group 
held their own evening meal.  They did not usually attend each others labor 
parties.  Derisive remarks and stereotyping of the other groups were not 
infrequent.  There was no inter-marrying.  At large public events like weddings, 
naming days, and the karama meals that marked the return of migrants or other 
events of good fortune, groups would show up together along ethnic lines: first 




4.  THE DYNAMICS OF VILLAGE POLITICAL STRUGGLES 
 In Bireka, class, gender, ethnicity and community were interrelated social 
constructs that, together with the political institutions such as the village 
sheikh and omda and the People's Committee, constituted the structures within 
which individual political action was embedded.  Gender politics and ethnic 
loyalties in particular confounded simple class and corporate community 
approaches to politics.  Hausa, Arab, and Burgo identities shaped political 
interaction, and these ethnic identities were also significant components of the 
intra-household politics that reproduced divisions of gender.  Shared notions 
of gender roles in turn also shaped village politics, which was after all not 





 We shall see this quite clearly in this section, where we describe and 
analyze the micro-dynamics of local politics in two situations of conflict where 
the role of women in public and economic life figured prominently.  The first 
conflict was over control of a woman's grain cooperative, the second over the 
permissibility of women working along the roadside. 
4.1 'Cooperative Conflict'? Drought and Community Struggles over Access to 
Resources  
We will tear down the grain store with our bear hands, 
and leave the rubble in the street for lorries to run 
over it, so that everyone can see how the rich tried to 
destroy the cooperative. 
                              Bireka villager, 1990 
 
 In 1989 the Regional Ministry of Cooperatives and UNICEF organized a grain 
bank project among the women of Bireka in 1989.  The villagers contributed to 
the building of a storehouse, and UNICEF provided a large quantity of grain as 
start-up capital for the bank.  Only the Arab and Burgo women in the village 
participated.  Several Hausa men claimed that Hausa women could not participate 
because it was not possible for them to be present at public functions or to 
participate in public work.   
 After the grain arrived, the Burgo and Arab women promptly distributed it, 
deposited the proceeds from the sale with the Ministry of Cooperatives, and 
waited for the next allocation.  This was not quite the theory of the grain 
storage project.  In principle, they should have waited until the rainy season 
to distribute the grain, when grain prices were highest and cheap grain would 
alleviate the cash constraint on agricultural production.  The women however 





knew that the quicker they disbursed the subsidized grain the quicker they could 
petition for a new shipment. 
 Grain prices rose sharply in 1990 as the prospects for a good rainy season 
diminished, and this precipitated a serious struggle within the village over the 
cooperative.  Hassan, one of the prominent Arab men in the village, a supporter 
of the National Islamic Front
xxiii
, and a relative of both the omda and sheikh, 
began to attend and attempt to control the meetings.  He expressed 
dissatisfaction with Khadija, the Burgo woman who was the president of the 
cooperative.  She was highhanded and put on airs, he argued.  She was corrupt 
and was personally benefitting from the project. 
 Initially, the conflict could easily have been characterized as the result 
of individual animosities and personality clashes.  Khadija, whose husband had 
left her and remarried, relished her role as village spokeswoman and leader for 
development projects.  She travelled alone to El Obeid frequently; an anomaly 
in a village where many women had never travelled the forty kilometers to the 
city.  Khadija had close social ties with the Cooperative extension agent, and 
she may have known that he would refuse to let the villagers revoke her position 
as President.  There may well have been petty graft or unacknowledged 
perquisites.  Khadija's brother was a village trouble-maker.  In the past, when 
the family was wealthier and there were more Burgo in the village, he held 
considerable power.  In 1990 he was no longer wealthy, but still played the role 
of spoiler and political gadfly.  
 Hassan, on the other hand, was a strong supporter of the ideology of the 
NIF.  He thought that women should not be active in public spheres.  He was 





could afford the derision this sometimes occasioned from other villagers, because 
he was the wealthiest man in Bireka.   
  Hassan organized the sending of a letter signed by slightly fewer than 
half of the women in the cooperative, requesting that the Ministry remove the 
president and hold new elections.  His wife was put forward as an alternative 
candidate.  The Cooperative officer from El Obeid would not allow them to replace 
the president; the rules of the charter would not permit it, he declared.  If 
the members could not agree, he would have to shut the cooperative project down.  
The officer made it clear that a shipment of grain would be provided only if the 
cooperative could resolve its problems. 
 Instead, in a series of meetings over the summer, the conflict escalated.  
On several occasions, Hassan was asked to leave cooperative meetings, both by 
the members and by the cooperative officer.  He refused to do so.  He was 
supported by other wealthy Arab villagers who did not like a powerful woman from 
the Burgo ethnic group controlling the cooperative; they would rather disband 
the cooperative and block the villagers access to cheap grain than have Khadija 
remain as president.  Privately, some of the other Arab families admitted that 
they did not believe Khadija was corrupt, but felt compelled to support Hassan, 
the wealthiest and most powerful man in the village.   
 Hassan's involvement caused other village men to join the fray.  Their 
conflicting interests brought the idioms of class and ethnicity into the 
struggle.  The poorer villagers from Arab families articulated the struggle as 
between the wealthy Arab families and the poorer Arab and Burgo families.  'The 





poor would tear down the mud storehouse and leave it in the road, for all to see 
how the rich had 'destroyed' the cooperative.   
 Idioms of gender roles were used extensively; the Burgo woman was a female 
household head, and some men argued that they should have more control and 
influence in the 'women's' cooperative.  Many women shouted them down; men had 
no role in this women's cooperative.       
 Tensions reached a fever pitch when Khadija, in a desperate bid to retain 
control of the women members, trumped her wealthy Arab opponents by inviting the 
Hausa women to become members.  Hausa men had originally been satisfied with 
Hausa women's non-participation, claiming that it would undermine the status of 
women to be seen engaging in the various manual activities of the cooperative.  
But with the rise in the price of grain and the shift in the rhetoric, the Hausa 
men were faced with a strong incentive to renegotiate their opposition to female 
participation.  Moreover, the issue of ethnic rights in the village became 
central.  Some Arab and Burgo men claimed that the village was 'their' village 
and hence the project was 'theirs'; Hausa women were, after all, outsiders to 
the village, and thus could not join the cooperative. 
 The additional members would dilute the available grain that the 
Cooperative Ministry claimed was forthcoming.  The Arab and Burgo families would 
receive less.  Nevertheless, the majority of the poorer villagers who sided with 
Khadija apparently determined that the smaller shares were worth the retention 
of control over the cooperative.  The maneuver succeeded; Hausa leaders, many 
of them wealthy themselves, and a majority of poorer men and women, made it clear 
that they would fight further attempt to remove Khadija.  Khadija retained her 





distribution began (unforseen at the time), with households receiving substantial 
quantities of grain, and rendered the conflict moot. 
 The triple idioms of ethnicity, class and gender were invoked in a struggle 
over access to resources; resources that were fundamental in alleviating the 
crisis faced by poorer villagers.  The Burgo president did not allow powerful 
men in the village to undermine her control.  She actively sought the backing 
of other Burgo women and the administration of the 'women's' project.  In 
development discourse, she was an independent, self-starting women, and therefore 
a perfect project leader.  The powerful Arab men wanted to control the project, 
pitched at empowering village women, once it became apparent that proceeds were 
more substantial than the usual weaved baskets and embroidery of most women-
based development efforts.  They used the discourse of proper public behavior 
of women to justify their interest.  When Hassan, the wealthy Arab, put forth 
his wife as a potential president, he contrasted her, a quiet, modest, pleasant 
young mother, with Khadija.  Khadija was a divorced, independent, brash woman, 
potentially corrupt.  Her brother was frequently called upon to 'control' her.  
She was, in dominant male village discourse, disrespectable and an inappropriate 
project leader. 
 A conflict that was initially phrased in terms of the role of men and women 
in public life was basically about competing claims to power in the village, and 
was ultimately resolved when the idiom of ethnicity was invoked.  It was perhaps 
ironic that Hausa men were confronted with a similar rhetoric of exclusion that 
they used on women.  In assessing the relative merits of the claims, they decided 
that Hausa identity depended less on the seclusion of women and more on an 





 During this period, the military regime in Khartoum was transmitting and 
implementing its own representations and principles of conflict.  As they 
filtered down to the village level, they shaped new relations of power and new 
discourses.  With the next case study, we illustrate how these changes 
transformed village relations and, in part, engendered a new crisis over the 
role of women's work. 
4.2  'Petty Crimes'? Conflict Over Women's Work at the Roadside 
To whip someone for a crime?  Yes. This is not new. It 
has existed since colonial times.  For petty things, 
instead of sending someone to prison, they are whipped. 
                               Ahmed Abdallah Idriss 
                       Sudan Minister of Justice, 1993 
 
...the police came and wanted to beat us, but we said 
we were the government and we would be beating them 
before too long. 
                                 Bireka villager, 1992 
 
  Changes in the power and dominance of representations about gender and 
ethnicity came into play in 1991 when government officials from El Obeid ordered 
closed the roadside stands at Um Belda, a truck and bus stop a few minutes walk 
away from Bireka.  Many women from Bireka operated gahawi- small tea stands and 
restaurants.  Most of these were younger unmarried Burgo women, but two older 
(and poor) Arab women also had stands.  Young Hausa girls sold sesame candies, 
roasted groundnuts and cowpea falafel, known as tami'a, that their mothers or 
older relatives made in the village. 
 Men also worked at the roadside.  One Hausa household of three brothers 
operated a stand, often hiring young Arab and Burgo men from Bireka.  The sons 
of a wealthy merchant from the market village operated a large tea stand.  Two 





up small stands in front of the gahawi and sold vegetables and cigarettes brought 
from El Obeid.  Farmers sold watermelons.  The stands were supplied by a Hausa 
man from Bireka who operated a fairly large store (also selling black market 
cigarettes and gasoline to lorry drivers and travellers), and an Um Belda man 
with a small tin shack, a kushk.  A Hausa butcher slaughtered sheep, goats and 
occasionally cows every morning.  An Arab from Bireka supplied the stands with 
bread from his small wood-fired bakery.  Young men from all ethnic groups were 
hired to build straw shelters, rakuba, and larger mud structures.  In 1990 the 
roadside was the most dynamic sector of the local economy. 
 Conflict was present.  The income earned by the young Burgo girls was 
extraordinarily high.  This sometimes led to conflicts within Burgo households.  
For example, in one family, the daughter had hired agricultural laborers with 
her earnings from her tea-shop.  She expected to control the crop income even 
though her parents considered the fields to be family agriculture.  These intra-
household conflicts over shares and control of income were managed and kept under 
control because the size of the pie was large and expanding; perceptions were 
that participation in the roadside economy was a positive sum game. 
 These perceptions were shattered in the spring of 1991, when the sheikh 
received a letter from the governor's office in El Obeid ordering the gahawi 
closed.  The official explanation was that the site would be surveyed and permits 
issued for 'proper' buildings.  Operators would have to pay a much larger fee 
for operating licenses. 
 Few believed that this was simply a case of 'public improvement'.  There 
were numerous stories about why the governor's office had closed the site.  One 





driver of the bus transporting a party of government officials had gotten drunk 
at Um Belda.  Another was that jealous merchants who did not have gahawi wanted 
the government to raze the existing ones so they could take over the area and 
build larger structures.  Some of the local National Islamic Front supporters 
alleged that the girls working at the gahawi were prostitutes.  Most people were 
convinced that Hausa-Burgo-Arab ethnic rivalries played a decisive role in the 
closing; people were sure that numerous letters had been sent to the governor's 
office alleging misbehavior by one group or another.  Larger political structures 
of regional administration were also supposedly involved; the next village down 
the road saw almost none of the trucks stopping, and the regional rural council 
president was from that village. 
 The stands remained closed for almost a year.  During that time a new 
organization started recruiting young people in the area.  Called Shabab al-
watan, 'The Nation's Youth', the organization was supposed to agitate on behalf 
of the Sudanese nation by mobilizing rural populations and by providing community 
services.  Members received identification cards, worked occasionally building 
schools, cleaning villages and towns, and held meetings.  In the El Obeid area, 
the leaders of the organization were sympathetic to the NIF.  They organized 
military training for chapters and fought alongside militias in southern 
Kordofan. 
 For many young people in Bireka, the organization provided a sanctioned 
forum for social activities.  One of the first acts of the local chapter was to 
build a small 'meeting house' on the outskirts of the village.  Many Burgo girls 
who worked at the gahawi were eager participants.  It was through their 





closure of the tea stands was no longer valid.  They had I.D. cards.  They were 
'members' of the Sudanese state.  How could working be a crime? 
 After the rainy season many of the young women began to work again at the 
truck stop.  After a few months the police came.  According to one young women: 
About ten girls were taken away, and spent the whole day in the 
'prison' yard next to the police station.  They were taken to El 
Obeid, and held outside the court.  The police did not take them in, 
because they knew that they had no reason to close the gahawi in the 
first place.  They brought the girls back. 
The women were emboldened by their victory, for they promptly reopened the 
gahawi. 
 A few months later, the omda finally received his formal authority from 
the government.  One of his first actions was to order the stands closed.  They 
were causing too much disruption, he argued, and the government had ordered that 
they be closed until proper procedures were established.  The benefits to his 
intervention were high and the costs relatively low.  Many Arab women resented 
the profits of Hausa and Burgo women and girls.  By using his authority to keep 
the tea stands closed, he acquired prestige and support from NIF supporters, 
merchants from neighboring villages, and his governmental superiors.   
 For several months the stands remained closed.  Then some of the girls 
decided that strictly speaking the government and the omda had closed the stands, 
but had not prohibited working, and so they started making tea under the trees 
near the road.  The police came again.  As one young woman put it: 
 They took the girls to court and said they would fine them LS 
300 or one month in prison.  How could people pay that much?  A 
delegation of women went to protest at the district offices and made 
a lot of noise.  The girls said they would not pay, they would go 
to prison.  But the police brought them out.  They were afraid to 
take them to the court in El Obeid.  They gave twenty-five lashes 





The whipping was the end of women working at the roadside.  By late 1992 all the 
stands were closed and overgrown; some of the mud walls had been torn down.  The 
two stores were open, but with very few customers.  Most lorries and buses simply 
drove past the roadside without stopping.  Everyone was poorer. 
 This conflict was symbolically framed around the issue of what work was 
appropriate for women.  Many villagers attributed the initial closing of the 
stands to alleged beer-brewing and an inappropriate work environment for young 
women.  The omda, though, was clearly less concerned about the issue of the 
morality of young women (the primary concern of the national government) than he 
was about preventing dissension and disrespect.  He and his wealthy supporters 
may have seen a threat to the economic power that underwrote, in part, their 
political power.  Moreover, national policy had forced him to act, by conflating 
his legitimacy with enforcement of a particular idea about how 'Sudanese' women 
should act.   
 While this conflict was nominally about a principle of conduct issue,  
power and control over access to resources were at the root.  The disruption of 
the closing of the tea stands caused many villagers to experience large drops in 
income, but some wealthy villagers were unapologetic.  As one villager noted, 
"If I'm sick and go to the doctor, I have to pay; now the poor complain about 
their problems, but they should have known better than to get sick."  In other 
words, the poor should know better than to challenge the rich.  It was not an 
accident that the divisions between the whippers and the whipped were the same 







 6.  CONCLUSION   
 Struggles over resources in rural Kordofan are intensifying.  The 
increasingly interconnected national economy holds out, with equal possibility, 
the promise of greater resilience and the threat of market-mediated entitlements 
crises.  The continuing mismanagement of the macro-economy, concomitant 
inflation, and internationally-engineered economic sanctions adds to this 
uncertainty.  This environment of economic and ecological instability has led 
not just to conflicts over resources but struggles over the meanings and 
representations that are crucial in the allocation of resources. 
 The cooperative conflict illustrates this point.  Wealthy men attempted 
to seize control of the women's grain cooperative because the grain had become 
extraordinarily valuable and important to village affairs.  They deployed a 
well-understood debate on the role of women in public life.  They asked: What 
kind of woman should be president?; A divorced woman from a poor family?  These 
objections were transparently selective: no one had questioned the woman who 
headed the adult literacy program, or Khadija's organization of a tree nursery 
planting for another development project.  The issue at hand was not really 
about what type of woman could head a project, but what group in the village 
would control power. 
 The importance of the resources at stake propelled Hausa men and women to 
renegotiate their representation of women's participation in public spheres.  
Hausa women joined the cooperative, not to assert their rights as women, but 
because both Hausa women and men wanted to assert their rights to be 'Sudanese', 





 These village-level discussions of what it meant to be 'Sudanese', or what 
it meant to be a woman active in public spheres, must also be placed in the 
context of larger economic and political changes in Sudan.  Villagers refracted 
national rhetoric and policy through local representations of gender, class and 
ethnicity; they were neither passive recipients of state policies and rhetoric 
nor stubborn resistors to outside influence, closed off from national discourses. 
 The devolution of authority to the omda illustrated this point.  He used 
his power to implement an important platform of the regime- a stricter regulation 
of women's public activities.  Just like Jaabir and his rifle and his membership 
in the Shabab al-Watun, the actions of the omda in closing the tea stands 
symbolized the government ideal of what it meant to 'become Sudanese'.  But the 
omda also embodied the multiple contradictions of the regime's manipulation of 
local representations and power structures.  One of his first acts was to appoint 
as assistant the grandson of an early colonial makk of the Tumam.  A Bireka 
villager argued that despite the young 'son of the makk' being less than a wise 
and seasoned leader, he conferred legitimacy on the omda: 'The makk has history.  
He and his family have been here a long, long time.  This land is their land.' 
 The appointment represents an interesting inversion of Kapteijns (1985) 
argument about Mahdist revolts in far western Sudan.  There villagers on the 
periphery apparently rallied around Mahdist leaders who invoked religion to 
legitimize their violent uprisings against an ancien régime that legitimized its 
rule by the principle of inheritance.  In 1992, the Khartoum government 
monopolized the discourse of Islam in its favor.  We do not know whether the 
government appreciated the irony of having traditional, 'tribal' leaders wield 





certainly did.  The omda was quick to invoke the discourse of inheritance, 'royal 
blood' and history to justify his invigorated authority.  He understood all too 
well the anomaly of his position of power; the very opposite of the regime's 
intended effort to transform rural villagers into 'Sudanese'.  He understood in 
particular the immediate practical implications of devolution, which was to 
fracture a multi-ethnic village by further excluding Hausa and Burgo from the 
levers of formal authority. 
 Other villagers appreciated and refracted government rhetoric in like 
fashion.  The young, unmarried Burgo woman who operated a tea shop and also 
belonged to the Shabab al-Watun had interpreted government rhetoric in an anti-
authoritarian and explicitly local manner.  For her there was no contradiction 
in being a Sudanese woman, a good Muslim, and working in a tea stand at a truck 
stop.  In the end she was whipped for her interpretations, not by representatives 
of the national government, but by the local 'traditional' powers recently 
delegated formal authority by the national government. 
 The conflicts we have analyzed in this paper are examples of an 
intensification of processes of immizerization and civil breakdown.  In late 
1992 there were clear markers of these processes.  Very few women earned income 
in public activities.  Only one or two women brewed sorghum beer.  The tea 
stands along the roadside were closed.  No Hausa girls sold their mothers' 
products there.  The closure of the roadside may have prompted many Burgo men 
to migrate from the village: stories of unimaginable hardship were told of their 
crossing the desert to work in Libya.  Only a few Hausa men could travel, because 





increased numbers of women left alone to manage their households confronted a 
hostile official world and became increasingly marginalized. 
 In 1992, the senior Hausa leader was resigned to bitter conflict with the 
Arab leadership.  The People's Committee had lost all legitimacy with the 
appointment of a poor, broken merissa drinker as the representative of the Arabs.  
The Arabs bypassed many respected community members who were Hausa.  After the 
death of the sheikh, the Arabs appointed his clearly incapable son as the new 
sheikh.  The principle of heredity had to be sustained in order to preserve Arab 
dominance, even if it meant rewarding an incompetent man.  They did not, however, 
undertake the process of an official investiture.  All recognized this cynical 
undermining of the legitimacy of the institution. 
 We began this paper by discussing a possible paradox in contemporary 
discussions of Sudanese politics: that by ascribing heterogeneous outcomes to 
the Khartoum agenda we may be obscuring the complex processes of transformations 
at the local level.  It is unclear whether these transformations will filter up 
to affect regional or national politics.  The presence of Jaabir's rifle, and 
of ethnic, gender and class conflict in Bireka, is of course no indication that 
what Prendergast (1991:49) calls 'a descent into Lebanon-like anarchy' is 
imminent.  Just a few hundred kilometers away, though, in southern Kordofan, the 
region had exploded into warfare during the late 1980's, and the actions of the 
Sudanese army and militias drew international headlines.  H.B. Ibrahim (1988) 
argues that the violence was not simply the result of an expanding Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (the main rebel group in southern Sudan opposing the Khartoum 





crisis', brought about by the differentiating effects of agricultural development 
projects and out-migration to Khartoum. 
 Much more comparative work would have to be done before we could determine 
and explain, with any confidence, how local processes contribute to the 
construction of widespread consent to nationalism and central authority.  Or how 
they undermine state power and lead to civil disintegration.  Before a story 
like that of Jaabir and the tea women and the Shabab al-Watun could be considered 
an adequate metaphor for local political processes, we would need comparable 
village-level analyses from other parts of northern Sudan, as well as intimate 







*This paper was inspired by the senior Hausa man in the village of Bireka use of 
the proverb, 'When with dwarves, it is best to stay on your knees', to describe 
the village political relations between Hausa and Arabs.  The general meaning 
was clear: when confronted with people who do not see things your way, you should 
be careful to pretend to see things their way, lest they resent your 
presumptuousness.  The context in which he used the proverb will become apparent 
in the text.  He and many other villagers in Bireka endeavored to teach us the 
basic principles of local politics, and the many inadequacies of this paper are 
a reflection of our inabilities to grasp all that was taught.  In the United 
States, Tom Bassett, Misty Bastian, Jeremy King and Shaun Malarney provided 
extensive comments.  We are also grateful to three anonymous referees for 
critical comments that led to a substantial rewriting of the paper. 
 
i.Cited in Mottahedeh (1985:294-5). 
ii.Several recent analyses of Sudanese society have approached the national-
local nexus of class, religious, ethnic and gender representations; see Baumann 
(1987), Doorbos (1988), Bernal (1994), and Simone 1994.  Only Simone (1994), 
however, devotes explicit attention to how Sudanese deploy these representations 
in political conflicts. 
iii.Warburg (1985:227) describes a similar breadth in the strategies and 
programs of Nimeiri to transform Sudanese society. 
iv.The re-ascendance of traditional leaders was by no means assured; Daly (1986; 
1991) has carefully documented the internal disputes within the British 
administration that led to the formal adoption of Native Administration 
discussing how the Khartoum administration did not really devote many resources 
to strengthening, formalizing and curbing the excesses of the institution of 
tradition leadership. 
v.Indian Ocean Newsletter (1 August 1993). 
vi.National leaders regularly visit Sheikan, the battle-site where the Mahdi 
defeated Hicks Pasha, in order to renew their nationalist credentials. 
vii.Though as Fluehr-Lobban (1990) points out, this nationalism was rarely 
secular, most political parties in the north were quite explicit in advocating 
the dominant role of Islamic ideas in the national domain. 
viii.Africa Research Bulletin (Vol. 30, No. 6).  For an interesting discussion 
of the original Mahdi's attempts to curb variegated Islamic practices in Sudan, 




ix.The name of the village, and all personal names, are fictitious. 
x.We are by no means trying to 'create' oppositional identities in this paper- 
the central focus is not how the character or nature of these identities motivates 
actors, but rather how they use these identities as vocabulary in political 
discourse.  See Spaulding and Kapteijns (1991) and A.A. Ibrahim (1988). 
xi.Interestingly, one of the first things the omda did, after power was 
officially transferred to him and the local court was abolished, was to hire the 
former court clerk as his assistant. 
xii.According to the 1955 census, Hausa made up almost 18% of the population of 
dar Bedeiria, the district that then surrounded El Obeid.  See Born (1965:115). 
xiii.One exception- an older Hausa man marrying a very young Burgo girl who was 
pregnant, and their subsequent divorce- proved the rule.  In some larger 
neighboring villages there were numerous examples of marriages crossing ethnic 
boundaries. 
xiv.The symbolic representations of Hausa women as secluded and submissive were, 
of course, confronted with harsh economic realities.  One poor Hausa woman said 
that while Hausa women could not work in agricultural production, she cultivated 
because she was poor.  A few other poorer and older women also farmed individuals 
plots, although they did not work on the family agriculture. 
xv.Hausa women also hand-pounded their grain into flour rather than taking it 
to town to be ground by the mill.  This was a point of pride for both the men 
and women.  Many Hausa indicated that their porridge was superior to that of the 
other ethnic groups because it was 'pounded by the strong arms of Hausa women'. 
xvi.On the other hand, O'Brien argues that in eastern Kordofan some West Africans 
have 'assimilated' Joama Arab identity because of specific influences of national 
and regional labor markets.  In these labor markets, the Joama are reputed to 
be good cotton pickers.  West Africans benefit from adopting the Joama identity, 
and local Joama have accepted migrants into the group because the migrants are 
an additional source of labor for their own fields. 
xvii.In other villages there were 'Fallata Arab'.  For a discussion of the 
meanings of 'Fallata', see Duffield (1988).  The term was used extensively by 
Arabs and Burgo, often in the presence of Hausa. 
xviii.Some reported, in 1990, making profits of from LS 30 on a bad day up to 
LS 100 on a good day, a time when the average daily wage for agricultural labor 
was around LS 30.  Most participated in a revolving savings fund with the other 
tea women.  One woman with three shares in the fund took home LS 3600 in savings 
every two months. 
xix.The raids were recounted with considerable hilarity, because the only person 
caught was the brother of one of the policemen.  Being a poor man unable or 
unwilling to pay the fine, his brother had to loan him the money to avoid being 
whipped. 
xx.Abdalla (1985) reports that rain prayers were held in dar Hamar villages in 
  
  
the early 1980's. 
xxi.(Bailey 1980) 
xxii.There was a direct correlation between age and wealth and the extent to 
which these ethnic differences were maintained.  Poor and young men interacted 
more freely. 
xxiii.Using the word 'fundamentalist' would be simpler but the term is now too 
connotative of disapproval and discourse about an 'Islamic threat' to western 
'national security'.  During our stay in western Sudan we never heard another 
word used locally to describe 'fundamentalists'.  Many times people would say 
"so-and-so is Jabha" referring to the National Islamic Front, or they might say 
"so-and-so is an akh Muslim", a member of the Muslim Brothers, or finally they 
might not say anything and just stroke their chins, with a knowing look, 
indicating that so-and-so's political/religious views were like those of 
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